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Abstract: Using an aggregate dynamic macroeconomic model,  we study the macroeconomic and 
financial  stability  under  flexible  inflation-targeting  regime  associated  with  intermediate  monetary 
growth  target.  Central  banks,  using  the  inflation  target  as  a  communication  and  strong  nominal 
anchoring device, should also take into account the movements of asset prices in their optimal interest 
rate  rule.  They  might  react  to  changes  in  asset  prices  without  introducing  asset  prices  into  the 
description of their policy objectives. We show that, the more flexible the inflation-targeting framework 
of monetary policy is, the more likely the monetary authorities are able to stabilise the economy around 
the long-term equilibrium. Therefore, achieving price stability under inflation-targeting regime with 
low  flexibility  can  generate  dynamic  instability  and  will  not  be  able  to  stabilise  effectively  the 
fluctuations of output and inflation.  A commitment to a long run growth rate of money supply 
corresponding to the inflation target can reinforce the credibility of the central bank and the 
role of inflation target as strong and credible nominal anchor for private inflation expectations 
and allows the system to be more stability prone. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, many central banks have adopted a new framework for conducting 
monetary policy known as inflation targeting. Since New Zealand first adopted this framework 
in 1990, a growing number of industrial  countries (including Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Finland and Australia) as well as emerging countries (Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Israel, 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and the South Africa, etc.
) have followed by anchoring their monetary policy to explicit quantitative inflation goals. 
Inflation targeting has been proposed as a tool to promote the central bank independence and to 
make obvious a deliberate attempt to improve their inflation performance. Namely, a credible 
announcement  of  inflation  targeting  would  convince  market  participants  to  change  their 
inflation expectations. 
In  this  context,  some  members  of  the  Federal  Reserve  (Fed)  have  also  suggested 
introducing  inflation  targeting  in  the  United  States  (Meyer,  2001;  Bernanke  et  al.,  1999) 
arguing  that  this  is  critical  to  secure  price  stability  in  the  US in  the  post-Greenspan  era. 
Goodfriend (2003), having described the features of inflation targeting practised implicitly by 
the Greenspan Fed,  recommends the Fed to strictly and explicitly target its constant long run 
inflation objective over the business cycle. Even academic discussions have suggested the Bank 
of Japan, which targets monetary aggregates, to adopt inflation targeting in an effort to help the 
Japanese economy to recover and get out of the eight years old deflation (Svensson, 2003; Ito, 
2004; Ito and Mishkin, 2004). Alesina et al (2001), in a discussion of the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy boldly claim that the ECB could improve its policy by adopting 
a version of IT. In fact, the new ECB is likely to have adopted a modified form of inflation 
targeting,  although  political  considerations  (the  need  to  demonstrate  continuity  with  the 
policies of the Bundesbank1) apparently will dictate that the ECB pays attention to monetary 
aggregates  as  well  in  its  two  pillars  strategy  (Bernanke  et  al.,  1999;  Svensson,  2000b; 
Rudebusch  and  Svensson,  2002).  It  is  comprehensible  that  some  academics  find  IT 
intellectually attractive for the high transparency about central bank intentions and the increase 
in accountability implied by the announcement of an inflation target, crucial to constraining 
discretionary  monetary  policy  so  that  it  produces  desirable  long-run  outcomes  (Michkin, 
1999). Nevertheless, others remain  sceptical about the effectiveness of this regime. Both the 
ECB (ECB, 2001) and the Fed (Gramlich, 2000) have argued that they do not regard IT as an 
appropriate monetary policy framework. Economists in the Bank of Japan argue that there are 
1 For Michkin (1999), the Bundesbank’s monetary targeting is quite similar to inflation targeting as it announced 
inflation target and communicated transparently to the public and market participants. 
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no clear instruments to get out of deflation, and a simple announcement without instruments 
would not convince market participants to change their inflation expectations (Ito, 2004). The 
current debate over whether the ECB has to move to full-fledged inflation targeting reminds us 
that currently, no study accounts for implicit  inflation targeting that the ECB practices with 
intermediate  monetary  growth  goal.  In  fact,  according  to  the  Maastricht  treaty,  without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ECB will also support the general economic 
policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the  Community.  These  include  a  high  level  of  employment  and  sustainable  and  non-
inflationary growth.
The essence of inflation targeting is that the central bank should strive to maintain inflation 
as  close  to  a  clearly  specified  target  level  as  possible,  while  at  the  same  time  limiting 
fluctuations of real economic activity. That corresponds to the description of flexible inflation 
targeting.  In  practice,  inflation-targeting central  banks  actually  all  pursue  flexible  inflation 
targeting  since  the  consequences  for  the  economy  of  strict  inflation  targeting are  simply 
undesirable  (Svensson, 1997, 2000a).  Empirical  evidence provided  recently by Collins  and 
Siklos (2004) suggests that countries with explicit inflation targets were not overly aggressive 
toward inflation.  Flexible inflation targeting shows up in less policy activism, gradualism in 
returning the inflation back to target, and in aiming at the inflation target at a somewhat longer 
horizon. 
During the process leading to the adoption of inflation-targeting regime, the policymaker 
must choose the relative weights to attach to inflation and output. This choice as well as the 
adoption  of  inflation-targeting regime  might  be  narrowly linked to financial  developments 
around the world in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the shift in the conduct of monetary policy in 
many  countries  from  monetary  targeting  to  inflation  targeting  follows  important  financial 
deregulation and innovations beginning in the 1980s, which have created ambiguity between 
different monetary aggregates. Precise definition and measurement of the money stock present 
some serious practical problems for policy makers who wish to use manipulation of the growth 
(or contraction)  of the money stock as a tool of economic  policy.  Decreasing interest  rate 
elasticity  of  money  demand  as  well  as  changing  velocity  of  money  circulation  has  been 
reflected in the instability of the money demand function. It is now difficult to control money 
supply in order to reach inflation and output stability goals. Along with financial liberalisation, 
firms have found other financing channels than loans from commercial banks. That decreases 
central  bank’s capability to affect firms’ investments by controlling credits through varying 
money supply. 
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Further  insights  for  the  role  of  financial  markets  development  can  be  gained  from 
comments on the adoption of inflation-targeting regime in emerging market economies. For 
Mishkin (2000) and Masson and  al. (1997), inflation targeting is a framework that could be 
used to conduct monetary policy in some high-to-middle-income developing countries. As we 
may  remark,  it  is  not  a  pure  coincidence  that  these  countries  have  also  more  developed 
financial  markets. However,  financial  markets are  comparatively underdeveloped and over-
regulated  in  most  emerging  market  economies  including  these  high-to-middle-income 
developing countries. Market conditions in these countries may require modifications of the 
typical policy rule that has been recommended for economies with more developed financial 
markets (Taylor, 2000).
In the same spirit,  Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2003)  study  whether there is any 
role  of  asset  prices  in  the formulation  of  monetary  policy  in  a  flexible  inflation-targeting 
framework.  Like them, we ask whether there is any role of asset prices in the formulation of 
monetary policy in a flexible inflation-targeting framework associated with monetary targeting 
as in the case of ECB, with its two pillars monetary policy. In other words, can the monetary 
targeting or implicit  inflation targeting, as practised by the Bundesbank, be successful in  a 
context where financial markets are more liberalised and asset prices more volatile? 
The large swings in asset prices and economic activity in the United States, the European 
Union, Japan, and other countries over the past several years have brought renewed focus on 
the role  of asset  prices  in  the transmission  of  monetary policy.  Monetary policy has been 
viewed as both a possible cause of asset price booms and a tool for defusing booms before they 
can  cause  macroeconomic  instability.  Recent  literature  on  the  linkages  between  monetary 
policy and asset markets focuses on how monetary policy might cause an asset price boom and 
how monetary policy  authorities  should  respond  to asset  price  booms2. A traditional  view 
focuses  on  the response  of  asset  prices  to a  change in  money supply,  arguing that  added 
liquidity causes asset prices to rise as a link in the transmission of monetary policy actions to 
the economy as a whole. A second view argues that asset price booms are more likely to arise 
in an environment of low and stable inflation, where monetary policy can encourage asset price 
booms simply by credibly stabilizing the price level3. According to  Borio and Lowe (2002), 
low inflation can promote financial imbalances, regardless of the underlying cause of an asset 
price boom. For example, by generating optimism about the macroeconomic environment, low 
2  See e.g.  Vickers (1999),  Goodhart (2000),  Bernanke and Gertler (1999,  2001), Cecchetti et al (2000), Bean 
(2003)  and Millard and Wells  (2003).  For a synthesis, see Gilchrist and Leahy (2002).   See also Gramlich 
(2001), Poole (2001), Trichet (2002).  
3  This view is suggested by Austrian economists in the 1920s and more recently by economists of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). See Bordo and Wheelock (2004). 
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inflation might cause asset prices to rise more in response to an increase in productivity growth 
than  they  otherwise  would.  A third  view,  coming  from  the  dynamic  general  equilibrium 
macroeconomics literature, argues that asset price bubbles can result from failure of monetary 
policy to credibly stabilize the price level. In these models, poorly designed monetary policies, 
such as the use of interest rate rules without commitment to a steady long run inflation rate, can 
lead to self-fulfilling prophesies and asset price bubbles (Woodford, 2003). 
Some researchers,  addressing how monetary policy  authorities  should  respond  to asset 
prices, think that asset prices should be considered as a part of price stability that is the sole 
objective of many independent central banks. Cecchetti et al (2000) argued strongly to put asset 
prices as direct measure of the goal of monetary policy.  Monetary policy should react when 
asset  prices  become  misaligned  with  fundamentals.  Similarly,  Smets  (1997)  argues  that 
monetary  policy  tightening  is  optimal  in  response  to  “irrational  exuberance”  in  financial 
markets. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) examined monetary policy in the presence of asset price 
bubbles, with application to Japan. Their results indicate that the Japanese policy was too tight 
from 1985 to 1988 and too lax from 1988 to 1990, fuelling a stock bubble, and too tight, again, 
from 1992 until at least 1996. They argue that even without explicitly targeting the asset prices, 
the Bank of Japan should have tightened from 1998 to 1990, probably ending the bubble, much 
earlier.
On the other hand, discussions in Gertler  et al  (1998) argue that the monetary authority 
should not respond directly to asset price movements, but instead should monitor them for their 
informational  properties.  Indeed  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  identify  asset  price  bubbles. 
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that monetary authorities possess more information 
about fundamental asset prices than the market4. This topic seems very crucial since responding 
to asset price fluctuations is likely to increase significantly macroeconomic stability only if 
bubbles are identified in their  infancy, which is by definition the time when they are most 
difficult  to  identify.  But,  even  if  one  could  successfully  identify  bubbles,  there  are  other 
reasons why a monetary authority might not react directly to asset prices. First, many financial 
prices are noisy and volatile making signal extraction difficult. Second, current asset prices 
reflect expectations about future monetary policy and risk premium integrated in asset prices 
tends to vary in time. Finally, if policy is explicitly guided by asset prices there is a risk of a 
potentially  destabilising circularity.  Bernanke and Gertler  (1999,  2001)  and Cecchetti  et al 
(2000), using a dynamic New Keynesian model (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999) evaluate the 
appropriateness of a policy response to asset prices by exploring the efficacy of a variety of 
4  For example, Cogely (1999) advances the existence of the bubbles and Goodfriend (1998), suggests that asset 
prices are too volatile and reflect little economic activity.  
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interest rate reaction functions in simple calibrated stochastic model economies in which asset 
prices play some explicit role.  Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that the inflation targeting 
approach dictates that central banks should adjust monetary policy actively and pre-emptively 
to  offset  incipient  inflationary  and  deflationary  pressures.  Consequently,  monetary  policy 
should not respond to changes in asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected 
inflation. In the opposite, Cecchetti et al (2000) suggest that a central bank concerned with both 
hitting an inflation target at a given time horizon, and achieving as smooth a path as possible 
for inflation, is likely to achieve superior performance by adjusting its policy instruments not 
only to inflation (or its inflation forecast) and the output gap, but to asset prices as well. 
In this paper we use an aggregate dynamic macroeconomic model in order to examine the 
macroeconomic stability under inflation-targeting regimes with different degrees of flexibility 
(strict and flexible inflation targeting in the sense of Svensson, 1997) in which asset prices play 
some explicit role on the conduct of the optimal monetary policy. For the inflation target to be 
an  anchor  in  all  circumstances  (temporary  or  persistent  shocks)  for  private  inflation 
expectations, we show that credible commitment of central bank to a steady long run inflation 
rate is necessary. This is translated in our model by a commitment to a long run growth rate of 
money supply (two pillars strategy of the ECB). We show that, the more flexible the inflation 
targeting is, the more likely monetary authorities are able to stabilise the economy around the 
steady-state equilibrium. A flexible inflation targeting central bank should bear in mind those 
longer-run consequences of asset price bubbles and financial instability in the setting of current 
interest rates. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 1, we develop a theoretical 
model of the economy in which financial asset prices play a role. In Section 2, we characterise 
the optimal reaction function of the central bank in which the optimal monetary policy respond 
to asset prices movements, among other economic indicators. Section 3 concentrates on the 
study of the dynamic stability of the economy. Section 4 examines the effects of the various 
economic shocks. Section 5 concludes.
 
2. The Model  
We consider  an economy described  by an  inflation  adjustment  equation,  an  aggregate 
spending relationship linking output to real interest rate and stock prices, and two equilibrium 
conditions  in  financial  markets  (money,  bonds  and  shares).  Inflation  is  governed  by  an 
expectational Phillips curve of the form:
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                                         piεαpipi +−+=
∗ )( yye ,     0>α ,                                  (1)   
where pi  ( )dtdp /≡  is the inflation rate, epi  the expected inflation rate, y  the current output 
(or growth rate),  ∗y  the natural rate of output and piε  an inflationary (or supply) shock. The 
output depends negatively on the expected real interest rate, )( ei pi− , and positively on the real 
value of shares in the stock market, q , as follows:
   0 ,          ,)( >++−−= γβεγpiβ de qiy .                      (2) 
where i  is the nominal interest rate and dε  is a demand shock. In equation (2), it is recognized 
that stock price plays an important role in determining aggregate demand. First of all, being 
part of net wealth, it can affect households’ consumption. Second, determining the value of the 
existing capital  relative to its  replacement  cost  (Tobin’s q  theory of  investment),  it  affects 
firms’  investment level.  Third,  being net worth and used as collateral,  it  affects the firms’ 
balance-sheet position and so the risk premium to accept for obtaining funds in the capital 
market. A fourth mechanism linking the stock market with aggregate demand could be the 
household liquidity effect: an increase in stock price can imply an increase in the net wealth of 
households, which in turn increases consumption spending. A final mechanism is referred to as 
the confidence channel. The confidences of consumers, even these who do not own any share, 
and that of entrepreneurs, even when their companies are not quoted in the stock market, are 
positively related to the level of stock price. 
As bonds and shares are considered here as perfectly substitutes in the portfolios of private 
agents (i.e., absence of risk premium), the arbitrage between bonds and shares implies the same 
expected yield in the short run for these two assets: 
 
q
y
q
qi
e
e ψpi +=−  .       (3) 
In equation (3), the expected yield for shares is composed by the expected rate of capital gains 
or losses 
q
q e  and the rate of distributed dividends q
yψ
, where the term yψ  represents the firms’ 
profits, which by assumption are entirely redistributed (ψ , assumed to be constant, is the share 
of profits in national income). Equation (3) can be solved, under the transversality condition, in 
order to obtain the expression for stock price in terms of actual (present) value of the expected 
future profits: 
dsdtttisytq
s
t
e  })]()([{ exp )()(
0 ∫∫ −−= ∞ piψ .                                         (4) 
7
Equation  (4)  can  be  written  in  the form of  dynamic  equation  where  one  can  introduce  a 
variable  representing exogenous shocks,  qε ,  affecting shares  yield and inducing difference 
between the rates of return of bonds and shares:  
                         q
e yqiq εψpi +−−= )( .                            (5) 
Various factors, such as the formation of “speculative bubbles” or/and an exogenous variation 
of risk premium associated to different assets5, can be at the origin of qε . Finally, the money 
market equilibrium is characterised by 
             milyllpm ε+−+=− 210 ,     0, 21 >ll                                        (6) 
where m  represents the nominal money supply and p  the general price level. The real money 
demand,  pm − , depends on the real income  y , nominal interest rate, i , and an exogenous 
shock affecting the money market,  mε .  Thereafter,  it  is  assumed that central  bank uses an 
interest rate rule to conduct its monetary policy. Taking the time derivative and noting that 
µ=m , pi=p , equation (6) can be written as follows: 
                                   milyl ε+−=pi−µ 
 21
.           (6a)  
Equation (6a) implies that, in order to satisfy long-term stationarity (with 0====pi iyq  ), 
monetary authority is constrained to set a growth rate of money supply consistent with the 
inflation target, i.e.  m
T
m ε+pi=ε+µ=µ  , where  µ  is the long run money growth consistent 
with  the  inflation  target  Tpi=µ .  On  the  opposite,  optimal  monetary  policy  could  not  be 
credible because current inflation rate will be systematically different from expected inflation 
rate due to the rational belief  of private sector that monetary authority will  always apply a 
monetary policy consistent with this inflation target.  If this is  the case,  private agents will 
expect an inflation rate different from the inflation target announced by the central bank. Thus, 
inflation  targeting  will  not  offer  the  nominal  anchor  for  private  inflation  expectations  as 
assumed in the inflation-targeting literature.
  
3. The optimal monetary policy rule
We assume that monetary authorities act systematically to minimize fluctuations of output 
around the natural rate, ∗y , and inflation around its inflation target, Tpi . The nominal interest 
5  See Schiller (1981), Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993).
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rate is treated as the direct instrument of monetary policy. Central bank is assumed to minimize 
the present discounted value of the following intertemporal loss function:  
 dtttLEt )exp()(
0
θ−∫∞ ,    with  ])()([21)( 22 TyytL pipiκλ −+−= ∗ , 0 , , >θκλ ,    (7) 
where E  is the expectation operator. Preference parameters λ  and κ  denote respectively the 
importance that authorities place on output and inflation targets.  θ  is a discount factor.  The 
optimal monetary policy is the solution to the sequence of single period decision problems of 
monetary  authorities.  These  decision  problems  being  independent,  the  central  bank’s 
optimisation problem consists simply of minimizing the one-period loss function,  L , in (7). 
Thus, the first-order condition is given by  
)()( Tyyy pipiκ
pi
λ −−=−
∂
∂ ∗     ⇒    )( Tyy pipi
λ
κα
−−=
∗ ,            (8)
which leads to the following central bank’s optimal monetary policy rule (see, Appendix A):
     eTd yqi pipipiλ
κα
εγβ +


−++= ∗ )(- 1    (9) 
where  the time-consistent  expected  inflation  rate  of  private  sector  are  equal  to the central 
bank’s inflation target 
                    Te pipi = , (10)
in the absence of persistent shocks (see equation A.7 in Appendix A).  
According to equation (9), it is optimal for the central bank to adjust the nominal interest 
rate upward to reflect expected inflation, the gap between current inflation and the inflation 
target, as well as increases in stock price and increases in output gap due to a positive demand 
shock.  There  is  no  major  difficulty  in  including  stock  price  in  the  central  bank  reaction 
function, since it is easily observable and observed in an instantaneous way6. Stock price at 
every moment conveys information contained in a set of data provided by individual investors 
having a more upstream knowledge than the central bank, concerning the origin and the nature 
of the shocks. Generally, stock price tends to react quickly to any information. Reacting to the 
evolution of asset prices undoubtedly gives an advantage to the central bank in order to react 
quickly and to stay in tune with the evolution of the economy. Otherwise, it takes a risk while 
trying to base its monetary policy decision only on the base of useful information all collected 
by  itself.  The  presence  of  stock  price  in  optimal  interest  rate  rule  reveals  that  monetary 
6 Some operational  difficulties might result from the short-run volatility of stock price. One way to avoid the 
repercussion of stock price volatility into the interest rate is to use a moving average with stronger weights being 
given to more recent developments of stock price.
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authorities must react to asset price movements even they cannot judge on the presence of 
mania or speculative bubbles phenomena, and the modification of risk premium.
4. The stability analysis
The dynamic behaviour of the economy can be summarised in a two first-order differential 
equations in inflation rate pi  and stock price q . A linear approximation at the neighbourhood 
of the steady state ( q , pi ) yields the following dynamic reduced form of the model (Appendix 
B):
                  



−
pi−pi

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
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where 



−=
λ
κα
βαη
21/1 ll  and 
α
ψ
βλ
ακ
−=Φ q  . 
Moreover,  in  this  economy  stock  prices  are  considered  to  adjust  more  speedily  than 
inflation rate. Stock prices, quoted in continuous time on a centralised market, are much more 
flexible than goods prices and wages. Thus they are free to make discrete instantaneous jumps 
in  response to “news” concerning all  previously unanticipated current or future changes in 
exogenous variables and policy instruments. On the other hand, inflation rate, resulting from a 
relatively slow adjustment of goods prices and wages due to the different costs of adjustment 
(e.g. menu costs), is considered as a predetermined variable. Therefore, the stock price  q  is 
considered as a forward-looking variable (clearing an efficient financial market) and inflation 
rate, pi  is a backward-looking variable7. This distinction is after all based on the relative speed 
of adjustment of these two variables.
Steady state is characterised by the condition 0== piq . Denote by A the state matrix of 
the two-equation dynamic system (11). The paths taken by inflation rate and stock price in their 
dynamic adjustment to steady state equilibrium depend on the signs of determinant and trace of 
A: 
           



+−−=Α qi T β
γ
piη)det(    and   qi
l
l T
β
γ
pi
γη +−+



Φ+−=Α  1)(tr
1
2 . 
7  See e.g.  Buiter and  Panigirtzoglou (2003) for a similar assumption concerning stock price and inflation rate 
dynamics. 
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Both signs of  determinant  and trace depend on the relative inflation  aversion  of monetary 
authorities,  λκ / , or in other words, the degree of flexibility of the inflation-targeting regime 
with  respect  to  the  competing  objectives.  This  leaves  us  with  qualitatively  distinct  phase 
diagram configurations in the q−pi  space. Consider  the conditions necessary for the sign of 
)det(Α  to be negative:
          0)det( <


β
γ
+pi−η−=Α qi T ,        when   2
2
1
α
β
λ
κ
l
l
<    and   Tqi piβ
γ
>+ .
These conditions reveal that the monetary authorities preferences ( ),λκ  influence the system’s 
dynamic stability. If the central bank weights strongly enough the output target ( λ ) relative to 
inflation target (κ ), one has 2
2
1
α
β
λ
κ
l
l
<  or 0>η . On the contrary, one has 2
2
1
α
β
λ
κ
l
l
>  or 0<η , 
when λκ /  is large enough. Moreover, condition  Tqi piβ
γ
>+  is verified if nominal interest 
rate is greater than the inflation target: Ti pi> . In fact,  if monetary policy leads to a nominal 
interest rate lower than the inflation target ( Ti pi< )8, an inconsistency appears in the evaluation 
method of shares adopted in this model (namely in terms of the present value of the future 
profits discounted at real interest rate). Specifically, when Ti pi< , inconsistency appears in the 
no-arbitrage equation between shares and bonds. At steady state, for a negative real interest 
rate, equation (3) implies that stock price should be negative to validate the yields equality 
between shares and bonds9.  However,  stock price cannot be negative by its nature (limited 
responsibility for shareholders) even if the price of an individual stock can fall to zero when a 
firm goes bankrupt. For a flow of positive aggregate profits, stock price must thus be positive. 
That would imply that the arbitrage condition is not  checked at steady state equilibrium. In 
other words, stock price calculated according to the discount formula (4) tends towards an 
infinite  value,  which  constitutes  another  anomaly.  A theoretical  solution  would  consist  of 
including a significant risk premium in the discount rate of profits so that stock price becomes 
again positive according to (3) or finite according to (4). For these reasons, we propose in the 
following to limit our analysis to the case where real interest rate would be positive.  
8  The case where  Ti pi< occurred in particular during second half  of years 1970 in USA and in Europe and 
corresponds to one period of macro-economic instability. 
9 In the short-run, a fall in stock price allows validating the no-arbitrage condition.
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a) Low inflation aversion 
The  case  of  low  inflation  aversion  (or  high  flexibility  in  the  inflation  targeting) 
corresponds to the following condition:
2
2
1
α
β
λ
κ
l
l
< ,     or     0>η .                   (12)
Under this condition, the slope of the 0=q  locus in q−pi  space (Figure 1) is:
0/)(
0
>Φ+−−=
=
qi
dq
d T
q β
γ
pi
pi

 
where 0<Φ . Indeed, 0<Φ if 2α
ψβ
λ
κ
q
< , or when monetary authorities assign a small weight 
to inflation target. Further, the slope of the 0=pi  locus in q−pi  space is 
 0)/()( )1/()(
2
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0
>Φ−+−=Φ−+−=
=
γ
β
β
γ
piβ
γ
β
γ
piβ
γpi
pi
l
qilqil
dq
d TT

. 
Both 0=q  and 0=pi  lines are upward sloping, and the 0=q  line is steeper than the 0=pi  
line. In formal terms, the system (or matrix Α ) will have one stable eigenvalue and therefore 
saddle-point equilibrium. With one predetermined and one non-predetermined variable,  the 
presence  of  a  stable  and  an  unstable  eigenvalues  guarantees  the  existence  of  a  unique 
convergent  path.  The  transversality  condition  implies  that  rational  agents  will  not  choose 
unstable solutions. Economic agents are assumed to be able to find the unique convergent path 
thanks to their capacity of rational expectations. In other words, the jump variable (stock price) 
will always attain the value required to put the system on the unique convergent path. 
Specifically, as parameter η  is positive (so that, 0)det( <Α ), a sufficient condition for the 
long-run equilibrium to be saddle-point is a sufficiently small value for the ratio λκ / , that is, 
2
2
1
α
β
λ
κ
l
l
< .  This  ratio  represents  the  relative  weight  assigned  by  monetary  authorities  to 
inflation  target  (or  inflation  stabilisation).  In  other  words,  λκ/  characterizes  the monetary 
authority’s inflation aversion. In the extreme case, when 0=λ  (i.e., ∞→λκ / ), we have the 
case  of  a  strict  inflation  targeting.  This  means  that  monetary  authority  only  cares  about 
inflation.  In  the  opposite,  ∞→λ  (i.e.,  0/ =λκ ),  monetary  authority  has  a  very  strong 
preference  for  output  target.  In this case,  we have the extreme case of a  flexible  inflation 
targeting.  Therefore,  according  to  the  condition  (12),  only  a  high  degree  of  flexibility  in 
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inflation targeting allows the steady state equilibrium to have this saddle-point configuration, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
Under the inflation-targeting regime with high flexibility or an accommodative response of 
the central bank, nominal interest rate rises in a smoothing manner following an initial increase 
in inflation rate due to an exogenous shock. Given inflation expectations, real interest rate will 
rise and involve a reduction in aggregate demand due to its negative effect on consumption and 
investment.  The fall  in  aggregate demand allows reducing smoothly inflation  pressure  and 
expectations.
The range of value for the ratio λκ/  compatible with saddle-point equilibrium depends on 
parameters  (β ,  1l ,  α  and  2l )  reflecting the economic  and financial  characteristics  of  the 
underlying economy. If β  and 1l  have higher values and α  and 2l  smaller values, the central 
bank  can  give  greater  relative  weight  to  the  inflation  target.  We  notice  that,  higher  β  
corresponds to more important financial  development  and smaller  2l  to lesser  interest  rate 
elasticity  of  the money demand.  More  financial  developments  and decreasing  interest  rate 
elasticity of the money demand can give the central bank more liberty to define its inflation-
targeting framework or the government to appoint a more conservative central banker without 
creating macro-economic and financial instability.  
        pi                           S          0=q
    
               
                                                                                                             
0=pi
                                           
  
                                                                                  
        S
 q
  Figure 1. Phase diagram in the case of high flexibility in inflation targeting 
b) High inflation aversion
We now switch to consider  a  monetary authority with a  high  inflation  aversion  (or  a 
relatively low flexibility in the inflation targeting) in the sense that:
  2
2
1
α
β
λ
κ
l
l
> ,         or       0<η .                                      (13)
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Under condition (13), the determinant is positive: 0)det( >


β
γ
+pi−η−=Α qi T . Thus, three 
cases can be distinguished as follows:
i) The system is locally unstable when 0)(tr >Α . This is equivalent to the following condition
              

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where )(ˆ qii T β
γ
+pi−= . As we previously admit Ti pi> , it is easy to show that 0ˆ1 >− i
q
β
γ
. We 
also assume that 0ˆˆ 2
2
2
2
1 >−−
iill
l γ
α
ψ
α
β
α
β
. According to the condition  Ti pi> , this assumption 
can be rewritten as  )(
1
1
2
l
lq ψγβα
γ
+> . In other terms, economy has a relatively important 
capitalisation  ( q ).  As  there  are  two  positive  real  eigenvalues,  the  system can  be  simply 
explosive if  0)det(4)(tr 2 >Α−Α  or cyclically explosive if  0)det(4)(tr 2 <Α−Α  (i.e., there 
are two imaginary eigenvalues with positive real parts), as shown in Figure 2. 
        pi                         0=q
    
           0=pi
                                                                                                             
                                             
                                                                               q
Figure 2. Phase diagram in the case of low flexibility in inflation targeting.
In Figure 2, we illustrate one particular case with 0<Φ  (the alternative case with 0>Φ  can 
be  worked  out  easily).  The  slope  of  the  0=q  locus  in  q−pi  space  is 
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.  The  slope  of  the  0=pi  locus  in  q−pi  space  is 
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ii) The system adjusts cyclically [ 0)(tr =Α ]. This corresponds to the case:    
                      2
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Under condition (15), the trace is equal to zero. There are only two imaginary eigenvalues with 
zero real parts. The system generates cyclical movements and never converges automatically to 
the steady state after any shock. When 2
2
1
α
β
λ
κ
l
l
> , or equivalently 0<η , 0)(tr =Α  is possible 
only if we have  01 2 >Φ+− β
γl
, that means  0>Φ  or  equivalently  2α
ψβ
λ
κ
q
> . Under these 
conditions, the slope of the 0=q  locus in q−pi  space (Figure 3) is:
0/)(
0
<Φ+−−=
=
qi
dq
d T
q β
γ
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pi

,   as 0>Φ . 
The slope of the 0=pi  locus in q−pi  space is:
0 )1/()( 22
0
<Φ−+−=
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β
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lqil
dq
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
,  if 01 2 >Φ+− β
γl
. 
Therefore, the absolute value of 
0=pi
pi
dq
d
 is superior to that of 
0=
pi
qdq
d

, as shown in Figure 3. 
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        q
             Figure 3. Phase diagram in the case of cyclical dynamics.
iii) The system is saddle-point stable [ 0)(tr <Α ]. This corresponds to the case where 
                                     
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The system can be simply saddle-point convergent, [ 0)det(4)(tr 2 >Α−Α ] as there are 
one  positive  real  eigenvalue  and one  negative  real  eigenvalue;  or  cyclically  convergent  if 
0)det(4)(tr 2 <Α−Α , as under this condition there are two eigenvalues with unreal parts of 
opposite signs. The condition 01 2 >Φ+− β
γl
 is imposed also here so the slopes of 0=q  locus 
and of 0=pi  locus in q−pi  space (Figure 4) are negative. The slopes of these two phase-lines 
are smaller than in the previous case. The absolute value of 
0=pi
pi
dq
d
 is always superior to that of 
0=
pi
qdq
d

, as shown in Figure 4.
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         0=q
      q
               Figure 4. Phase diagram in the case of intermediate flexibility in inflation targeting.
We observe  that  for  all  these  cases  where  the  condition  (13)  is  verified,  the  risk  of 
macroeconomic instability is more and more important when one increases the ratio λκ / . As 
λκ /  increases, the economy moves from saddle-point equilibrium, to cyclical equilibrium and 
finally to totally unstable equilibrium. Thus the optimal monetary policy rule could involve a 
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serious risk of  financial  and macroeconomic  instability when monetary authorities assign a 
higher and higher weight to inflation stabilisation or when, in the extreme case, they adopt a 
strict inflation-targeting framework of monetary policy. Under a strict inflation targeting, the 
monetary policy formulated only in terms of inflation target with an optimal interest rate rule 
could be ineffective to stabilise the economy although we suppose the central bank is credible. 
Comparing with the results of Dai and Sidiropoulos (2003), we remark that the introduction of 
a monetary growth rule  compatible  with the inflation target ameliorates the stability of the 
system. In fact, without the monetary growth rule, when the condition (13) is verified and when 
economic  agents  adjust  endogenously their  expectations  using information  extracting form 
financial markets data, we have financial and macroeconomic instability. 
To understand why financial and macroeconomic instability may arise, one can imagine 
the undesirable effect resulting from a aggressive reaction of nominal interest rate to inflation 
rate. In fact, a sharp increase in nominal interest rate increasing operational costs of firms in 
terms  of  debt  services  could  force  some firms  into  insolvency,  leading  thus  to  a  reduced 
competition  in  prices  and higher  inflation  pressure.  Economic  agents  could  anticipate  this 
inflationary pressure. They could then increase their demand for loans. That generates thus a 
further inflationary pressure. In this respect, many of emerging market economies (i.e., Latin 
American  countries  during  the  1980s)  and  transition  economies  (i.e.,  Eastern  European 
countries in 1990s) provide examples in which a sharp increase in nominal interest rate is not 
able  to  reduce  inflation  expectations  and  inflation  rate.  In  fact,  this  analysis  seems  to  be 
suitable  in  many of these countries  with insufficiently developed and fragile  monetary and 
financial markets. But, this does not mean that the Eurozone cannot be stroked by financial and 
macroeconomic instability in the case where the board of governors of the ECB named by 
European national governments are too conservative or choose itself a low degree of flexibility 
in the implicit inflation targeting regime. 
5. Effects of exogenous shocks 
A major motivation behind this work is to be able to understand what information asset 
prices can give us about the shocks affecting the economy. We now turn to an analysis of the 
impact and steady-state effects of three types of shocks affecting respectively aggregate supply, 
aggregate  demand  and  the  stock  market  equilibrium  condition.  We  consider  that  shocks 
affecting money demand don’t have any impact on the steady-state equilibrium because by 
assumption they are characterised as shocks without trends. Such a shock may affect the price 
of goods and services but not long-term inflation rate and real stock price.  
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a) Inflationary shocks ( piε > 0) 
According  to  equation  (1),  the  steady-state  equilibrium  conditions  imply  Te pipi = (see 
equation  10)  and  Tpipiµ ==  when  the central  bank has  full  credibility.  Consequently,  a 
supply shock has no steady-state effect on the inflation rate, 0 =∆pi . This is due to the fact that 
we assume that the money growth rate is controlled by the central bank at the level of inflation 
target. Its effect on the output is:
                
α
εpi−
=∆  y .  (17)
Its steady-state effects on the stock price is appreciated using equation (B.1) as follows:
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Finally, its steady-state effects on the nominal interest rate is given using (9), (10) and (18) as:
                  )( 00 β
γ
piαβ
γψεpi
qi
i
T +−
−
=∆
 .                                                      (19)
In order to examine the transitional dynamics of the model, it is convenient to consider 
initially the case of saddle-point equilibrium illustrated in Figure 1. The positive inflationary 
shock ( piε > 0) affects inflation rate through its impact on the supply side. In the long run, both 
locus  0=q  and  0=pi  shift  to  the  left  as  is  shown  in  Figure  5.  Stock  prices  drop  in  an 
instantaneous way to their new steady state level, while inflation cannot change remaining in its 
initial steady state level. Indeed, the adjustment process is entirely realised by the stock prices 
and the interest rate. The fall in stock prices gives the possibility to the central bank to react 
immediately by lowering sharply the nominal interest rate in order to stabilise the economic 
slowdown pressures  due  to the supply shocks.  This  allows the central  bank to react  more 
quickly than if should only reacts to the current inflation rate without an additional response to 
asset price movements. 
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Figure 5. Adjustment of the system following an inflationary shock in
the case of low inflation aversion.
   b) Demand shocks ( dε > 0) 
We now turn  to an analysis  of  the impact  and steady-state effects of  shocks affecting 
aggregate demand. A demand shock does not produce any steady-state effects on the inflation 
rate and the output. Indeed its steady-state effects on these variables are neutralised by the 
response of monetary policy. The demand shocks only affect the stock prices and the nominal 
interest rate. Using (B.1) and (9), it yields:
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Consider the case of saddle-point equilibrium illustrated in Figure 1. A positive demand 
shock ( dε > 0) is inflationary and leads monetary authorities to raise interest rate. Its impact on 
the dynamics of the economy is exerted through the optimised interest rate rule (see equation 
9). The latter affects then the long-term values and the dynamics of inflation rate and stock 
prices. As inflation rate and real output remain unchanged at the steady-state equilibrium, the 
rise of interest rate involves a shift of the curves 0=pi  and 0=q  
to the left. The real stock price 
will lower following the increase of long-run real interest rate. The adjustment process could 
be illustrated as shown in Figure 5.  
The  inclusion  of  stock  prices  in  the  optimal  interest  rate  rule  allows  the  monetary 
authorities to moderate its interest rate reaction by taking into account the instantaneous fall of 
stock prices. Indeed, a positive demand shock implies a rise of interest rate. But its direct effect 
on interest rate will be partially counterbalanced by a decrease of stock prices. 
c) Shocks affecting stock price ( qε > 0) 
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Shocks  affecting the  stock price  cannot  affect  inflation  rate  and  output  if  there  is  an 
appropriate  response  of  monetary  policy.  As  the  monetary  authorities  adopt  an  inflation-
targeting framework to stabilise inflation and output, their effects on inflation rate and output 
are neutralised. In fact, through the reaction of the nominal interest rate to the level of stock 
price (but not directly to these shocks, see equation 9), monetary policy neutralises their effects 
on aggregate demand and so they are not transmitted to inflation rate and output. Consequently, 
these shocks have only effects on the stock prices and the nominal and real interest rates. Using 
(B.1) and (9), we obtain:
,
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According to equation (9), the monetary authorities need only to know the level of stock 
price, which is easily observable. They are not urged, when applying the optimal monetary 
policy rule, to know what is the nature of these shocks. In other words, central bankers have not 
to  judge  on  the  presence  or  not  of  mania  or  speculative  bubbles  phenomena,  and  the 
modification  of  risk  premium  or  risk  aversion  of  financial  operators.  Indeed,  one  of  the 
arguments advanced by some academics and central bankers as to why a monetary authority 
might not react directly to asset prices is that monetary authority cannot judge the presence or 
not of speculative bubbles. In this respect, discussions in Gertler  et al  (1998) suggest that the 
monetary authority should not respond directly to asset price movements. This is because it is 
extremely difficult ex ante to identify asset price bubbles. Put another way, there is no reason to 
suppose monetary authorities possess more information about fundamental asset prices than 
the market. Goodfriend,  in  Gertler  et al  (1998), argues “central  bankers have no particular 
expertise  in  pricing  equities,  which  is  a  full-time  job  for  armies  of  stock  analysts  and 
investors.” According to Cogley (1999), the miss-adjustment of asset prices are too difficult to 
detect and the errors due to reaction at asset prices can increase the variance of output.  But 
even  if  one  could  successfully  identify  bubbles  there  are  other  reasons  why  a  monetary 
authority might not react directly to asset prices. Many financial prices are noisy and volatile 
making signal extraction difficult. Further, current asset prices reflect expectations about future 
monetary policy. But if policy is explicitly guided by asset prices there is a risk of a potentially 
destabilising  circularity.  These  arguments  militate  for  prudence  in  the  use  of  information 
conveyed by asset prices rather than to be unaware of them. 
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The adjustment and transmission mechanism is similar to the case of inflationary shock (
piε > 0). The dynamic adjustments can be illustrated in Figure 5.
5. Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we have  used  an  aggregate  dynamic  macroeconomic  model  in  order  to 
examine  the macroeconomic stability  under  alternative inflation-targeting regimes (strict  or 
flexible) in which asset prices play some explicit role on the conduct of the optimal monetary 
policy. We have examined the rationale of implicit inflation targeting like that of the ECB (two 
pillars strategy), as a communication and anchoring device, with a monetary policy responding 
also  to asset  price  booms. Solving the central  bank’s  optimisation  problem,  we derive  an 
optimal  interest  rule  where nominal  interest  rate is  set according not only to inflation and 
output, but also to asset prices. It is shown that achieving price stability under the regime of 
relatively  strict  inflation  targeting,  in  the  sense  of  Svensson,  can  generate  financial  and 
macroeconomic instability and will not be able to stabilise effectively the fluctuations of output 
and  inflation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  more  flexible  the  inflation  targeting  framework  of 
monetary policy is, the more likely the ability of monetary authorities to reduce the risks of 
future financial  and macroeconomic instability. A commitment to a long run growth rate of 
money supply identical to the inflation target, as part of the implicit inflation-targeting regime, 
can reinforce the credibility of the central bank and the role of inflation target  as strong and 
credible nominal anchor for private inflation expectations and allows the system to be more 
stability prone. 
One important implication of our results for governments nominating inflation-targeting 
central bankers is that they must not choose a too conservative board of governors. The choice 
depends of course on the economic and financial characteristics of the underlying economy. 
More developed financial markets and more flexible labour market allows the diminution of 
degree  of  flexibility  in  inflation  targeting without  introducing  dynamic  instability.  For  the 
central  banks that practice explicit  or implicit  inflation targeting, more flexibility is without 
doubt a key to success as it reduces economic and financial instability and gains more support 
for their monetary policy. 
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Appendix A. Optimal interest rate rules of the central bank 
The central bank minimises a loss function of the following form: 
       dtttLEt )exp()(
0
θ−∫∞ , where ])()([21)( 22* TyytL pipiκλ −+−= ,   0 , , >θκλ .         (A.1) 
The decision of the central bank consists of solving its minimisation programme by taking 
account of subjacent economic model. The first-order condition is as follows: 
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According to (1), one has
αpi
1
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∂
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, and by using it in (A.2), one obtains: 
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−−= .                (A.4) 
Using (2) and (3) in the preceding equation, it follows: 
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e yqi pi−pi
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+−ε+γ=pi−β .           (A.5) 
That brings us to the following interest rate rule: 
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1 * .           (A.6) 
One can  then calculate  expected inflation rate by taking account  of the assumption  of 
rational expectations. According to (1), one has )( *yy eee −+= αpipi , that is to say *yy e = , 
which implies with (A.3): 
           
Te pipi = .             (A.7) 
By substituting the result of (A.7) in (A.6), one obtains: 
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1 * .                       (A.8) 
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Appendix B. The dynamic equations of stock price and inflation rate 
By  taking  account  of  the  equations  (1)  and  (10),  the  stock  price  dynamics  can  be 
characterised by the following equation: 
         q
TT yqiq εψεpipi
α
ψ
pi pi +−−−−−=
*)()( .                                                     (B1)
In order to obtain the dynamic equation of inflation rate, one time derives the variables in 
(4): 
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 ,            l l1 2 0, > .                                                     (B.2a) 
Knowing that µ=m  pi=p , Te pipi =  0=epi , that turns out to: 
         milyl εpiµ  +−=− 21 .                      (B.2b) 
In using the interest rate rule (A.8), one has: 
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According to (1) and (A.7), one has: 
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By using the results of (B.3) and (B.4), one obtains: 
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In admitting that piε , dε = 0, i.e. shocks without trend, one has: 
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Using (B.1) in (B.5), and in admitting a money growth rule m
T
m ε+pi=ε+µ=µ  , one can 
present the differential equation of inflation rate as follows:
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